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In December of 1994, México experienced a severe financial crisis of far-reaching consequences. To analyze this event, in the present work we propose a general equilibrium model in which the participants are private agents that interact with an active Central Bank, whose objectives are securing stability in both prices and the exchange rate. This GE model also takes into account the financial restrictions of the Federal Government over time, whose eventual insolvency determines the timing of the crisis. In the case of Mexico between 1991 and 1995, the model s computational simulation identifies the conditions that eventually led to the Mexican Government s insolvency in foreign currency. The predictive capability of the model relies on the characterization of an index of financial vulnerability , and on the quantification of a threshold level of international reserves at the Central Bank. From an economic policy perspective, we argue that the said indicators may be used as normative guides, so as to evidence the financial vulnerability of a country and, hence, to call for the adoption of policy measures aimed at preventing the materialization of this kind of financial crises.

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Earned a BA in Economics from ITAM (Mexico), and masters and PhD degrees from the University of Houston. Has acted as Senior Advisor to the General Director at Pemex, and as Chief of Staff to the Undersecretary of Hydrocarbons. Since 2013 he has performed as Planning Director at Mexico´s National Bank of Sanvings and Financial Services (BANSEFI).

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